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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 50X1-HUM

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The following is a report which includes comments on various aspects of Premier Khrushchev's state visit to Yugoslavia in August-September 1963. These include an appraisal of the political gains achieved by the two heads of state; an estimate of possible future political moves, in particular with reference to the "non-aligned nations"; and a general description of the Yugoslav popular reaction to the visit. The agreement between the two leaders whereby the Soviet Union would supply the necessary materials for Yugoslavia to distribute to the "Third World" under a Yugoslav label is particularly noted.

Thoughts on the Visit of Khrushchev to Yugoslavia

1. Yugoslav President Tito gained positive results from his meetings with Soviet Premier Khrushchev during the latter's visit to Yugoslavia from 20 August to 3 September 1963.

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The Soviet leader, however, achieved less as a result of the meetings than he had anticipated.

2. The Yugoslav position with respect to the West remains the same as it was prior to the meetings; it appears that in some respects the West has even gained advantages, in that during the Khrushchev-Tito talks Tito revealed an almost respectful attitude in regard to Western nations. His attitude was very cautious; he was constantly aware of the problem of not hurting any feelings or, worse still, of arousing suspicions about his relationship with the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia's place as one of the "non-aligned" nations, emphasized many times by Tito, and its position as the leading nation of the "non-aligned bloc" were reluctantly recognized by Khrushchev, even though in the discussions and talks which continued throughout the visit Khrushchev pointed out frequently that a Socialist country like Yugoslavia could definitely not be considered as "non-aligned."
3. As a consequence of this Yugoslav drive to become the leader of the "Third World," Khrushchev obtained practical results in several ways (considering the fact that the Soviet Union enjoys neither the necessary confidence nor the respect of the "non-aligned" nations, but is even regarded with suspicion by some), by transferring to Yugoslavia the responsibility for aid to underdeveloped countries. For this purpose, Khrushchev reached an agreement with Tito, whereby the Soviet Union would furnish the necessary materials for assistance to the "Third World," for distribution under a Yugoslav label. Thus, Yugoslavia will be able to head an assistance program to various countries in accordance with a plan currently under consideration.1/ This accord also represents a form of recognition by Khrushchev of the brilliant way in which Tito has acted up to the present with regards to the "non-aligned" nations.
4. In a toast at Rakovica, Khrushchev reluctantly made an about-face and admitted the possibility of building Socialism through various methods, even though he had previously exclaimed during a discussion of the Yugoslav workers' self-governing councils: "It may be a modern system and I know little about it, but it is an obvious and clear violation of the Leninist principles of Communist Party leadership."

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5. A significant point in this controversy, as reported by Titov, the TASS correspondent, was the suspension of the distribution of the text of the address Tito delivered on the following evening. The Yugoslav president, having spoken in Russian, wished to have several points translated into Serbian in the most accurate way possible so as to avoid misinterpretation. Among other things, Tito had said in his speech:
 - (a) "Everyone can make mistakes; the Western journalists ask questions of this type."
 - (b) "Who will be the one in the present discussions who will make concessions? Problems of this type are not considered."
 - (c) "The workers' self-governing councils have a practical value and are expressions of genuine Leninism, achieving brilliant progress for which we shall continue to fight."
6. From the contradictory statements on ideological subjects, it can be deduced that the affirmations of mutual solidarity were accompanied by fine or completely explicit reservations. The latent antagonism had another noisy confirmation during Tito's reception at Brioni for the President of the Italian Senate Merzagora. A person considered trustworthy by the writer /not further identified/ had questioned the Yugoslav Ambassador to Italy, who had come from Rome expressly because of the presence of Senator Merzagora (this point was confirmed by the Italian Ambassador to Yugoslavia), asking him to clarify the definition of "blocs" made by Edvard Kardelj at one time; the definition had been poorly understood by the Russians and /Soviet President/ Brezhnev himself had requested a clarification when he visited Yugoslavia.^{2/} The interrogator, aware of the fact that Kardelj's corrected definition had not been favorably received by the Yugoslav Regime, wished to provoke comments by the Yugoslav Ambassador to Italy; the latter replied, however, "Let us ask Kardelj himself, who is here" - and without giving the flustered Kardelj time to speak, added apropos the corrected definition: "It is not exact, because the thinking of Comrade Kardelj is not always the same as the Government's."
7. The same interrogator subsequently asked Premier Khrushchev: "Is the fact that Yugoslavia, a Socialist country, is not a member of the Eastern Bloc an anachronism? Can the absence of Yugoslavia from the Warsaw Pact be an obstacle to Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement?" Khrushchev, a little annoyed (or weary), answered with a dry "No."
8. It is undeniable that Yugoslavia has not re-entered the Eastern "Camp" and has not conceded anything of substance to Khrushchev. Tito reaffirmed his own ideological, political and economic autonomy, and wrested from Khrushchev the recognition of his independence. Yugoslavia not only remains outside the COMECON (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance: CEMA) despite having received from Khrushchev in his talk at Split an explicit invitation, (Tito preferring bilateral agreements with the individual countries of the East) - but also plays no part in the Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev has not succeeded in making Tito return to the fold and, in consideration of this, has requested that Tito will at least not take a public stand on matters on the East - West level. On this last point, Khrushchev secured a meager satisfaction since Tito reaffirmed that Yugoslavia will never take a stand that would be prejudicial to the international Communist movement.

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9. Tito has confirmed that he is solidly with the "non-aligned nations" and in this field, as has been seen, he has the full support of Khrushchev, who knows that in the eastern socialist camp there are latent centrifugal forces straining to free themselves from the Soviet yoke and he knows well that the time has passed when Russia could respond and combat these tendencies with force. Khrushchev takes into consideration that Yugoslavia, although despised, has an enormous influence over Eastern countries and that, accepting in a certain sense Yugoslavia's autonomy, it is necessary to accept with it the due consequences and to take adequate precautions: "It is better to have Yugoslavia (even autonomous) as a friend than as an enemy." With this as a guide, Khrushchev was in a position to transform his Pyrrhic victory into a real political success with respect to the Eastern countries, which see a major liberalization in the development of profitable bilateral contacts as a result of Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia. In this way Khrushchev can reinforce his paternalistic attitude towards the Eastern countries, since he has always maintained that their accusations that the USSR exploits the Satellite countries are unfounded, and can emphasize that to surpass the West in living standards, the collective East must produce more, achieving production on a large scale, and that only a nation like the Soviet Union is in a position, with its high degree of specialization in various industrial fields, to meet an economic problem of this caliber without bringing misery on its own people who, as he (Khrushchev) well knows, are weary of further sacrifice. Khrushchev gave the impression of being tossed in a sea of difficulties, and that he intended his Yugoslav "working vacation" to silence for a little while his adversaries and revive the enthusiasm that the majority of his people had for him.
10. Negative views on Khrushchev, on the other hand, were expressed by the Belgrade correspondent of Radio Moscow, Bragin, a dogmatic, educated man, who has a degree in Slavic literature with special emphasis on Serbo-Croatian. According to this young man, Khrushchev is a blockhead who knows nothing and who does everything wrong. (Bragin drinks, makes a lot of noise and is dangerous himself.)
11. Insofar as the Yugoslav handling of the reception for Khrushchev and the carrying out of his itinerary during his visit to Yugoslavia are concerned, it must be said that the Titoists have been real masters, showing Khrushchev their best in the way of factories, agricultural cooperatives, shipyards, and letting him see the splendid tourist regions of the Dalmatian coast to the forests of Slovenia studded with lakes, and even injecting the tragic touch, to move him to pity, with destruction at Skopje. All this was done without allowing the visitor to see the vast uncultivated plains and the rural areas mirroring infinite misery and medieval backwardness, for it was so arranged that Khrushchev passed through these areas by night; daytime travels were on the other hand over the modern super-highways, etc.
12. Before Khrushchev's arrival, [Communist Party] cell meetings were held to pass on precise orders that the Soviet politician was to be received with warmth but without going too far in the demonstrations. Only at Rakovica, where from the beginning the directors had scattered among the workers a clique which, whether appropriate or not, was instructed to shout "Long Live Tito" or "Long Live Khrushchev" every ten minutes; the Russian premier, who is an orator and can fascinate crowds, succeeded in winning over the workers, not with an ideological or political speech but with a folksy talk, especially with his addressing the group as "Your Majesty, the Working Class", a phrase which aroused indescribable enthusiasm among the listening laborers.

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